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ABSTRACT
The “crime drop” is the most important criminological phenomenon of
modern times. In North America, Europe, and Australasia, many common
crimes have fallen by half or more since the early 1990s, albeit with varia-
tion in the speciﬁcs. Seventeen explanations are examined here including
demographics, policing, imprisonment, drug markets, and lead poisoning.
Pioneering research relevant only to the United States now appears, with
the beneﬁt of hindsight, somewhat parochial. Sixteen of the 17 hypotheses
fail one or more of four evidence-based standardized tests on which they
are assessed. The one that passes is the security hypothesis, underpinned
by crime opportunity theories. Here there is strong evidence that vehicle
theft fell because of more and better security, and mounting evidence that
improved security was critical in reducing burglary and other acquisitive
crime. Many crime types are interrelated, while most criminal careers are
dominated by property crime, so removing these volume crimes might be
expected to reduce violence.
I. Introduction
Truth is stranger than ﬁction. Twenty-ﬁve years ago, had anyone the
audacity to suggest that crime would soon embark on a steep and pro-
longed decline in most advanced countries, he or she would have been
laughed out of the room. It was unthinkable! Hence while it is popular
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to start essays such as this by pillorying those criminologists who pre-
dicted crime’s incessant rise, it is rarely acknowledged that such views
were almost universally held. This essay will not make predictions. It
will, however, provide theory and evidence to help explain why crime
has declined and conclude with policy recommendations for sustaining
the crime decline and extending it to crimes that are currently increas-
ing, such as Internet-related crime, smartphone theft, and other
iCrime.1
Has crime really declined? Where, by how much, and with what
variation? This is the topic of Section II that follows. There is emerg-
ing scientiﬁc consensus regarding the existence of an international
crime drop, with remaining debate focusing on the speciﬁcs. The most
reliable sources of information are victim surveys, particularly the na-
tional surveys of England and Wales, France, the Netherlands, and the
United States, all of which ﬁnd many types of common or street
crimes, such as assault, burglary, and car crimes, to have declined dra-
matically since the 1990s. National sources are buttressed by the In-
ternational Crime Victims Survey, the only methodologically standard-
ized general victim survey, and it indicates the international nature of
crime’s decline. While supplementary sources including police-
recorded crime data, health data, and insurance data are each individ-
ually less reliable, the extent of supporting evidence they provide is
rather overwhelming: the likelihood that so many different sources in
different places point in the same direction by chance is inﬁnitesimally
small. There is variation in when, by how much, and which crime types
have fallen, but such variation around the mean is to be expected in
the real world and adds to overall credibility. An overview of this evi-
dence is given in the ﬁrst section of this essay, but there is no real
diversion from the general theme: crime has declined in many ad-
vanced countries, though sometimes with considerable variation in the
timing and trajectory.
Why has crime declined? This is the subject of Section III of this
essay. Seventeen hypotheses are examined. Much of the pioneering
research focused on declining violence in the United States, exem-
pliﬁed by the landmark collection of studies edited by Blumstein and
Wallman (2000). This seems to form a natural “phase 1” of research
1 Roman and Chalﬁn (2007) use the term “iCrime” to refer to theft of attractive
electronic goods such as phones, computer laptops and tablets, GPS satellite navigation
systems, and the like.
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that was highly innovative and informative but that has been rather
superseded by the emergence of what is here characterized as phase 2
crime drop research: growing recognition of the international nature
of the crime drop and the importance of declining property crime.
Explanations proposing that crime fell because of particular character-
istics of the United States now appear somewhat parochial. The clear-
est evidence for this comes from Canada, which has similar crime
trends and strong socioeconomic and cultural links but signiﬁcantly
different policies in many of the areas where explanation has been
sought. The suggestions that crime fell because of legalized abortion
or a decline in lead poisoning of children appear unable to account for
the fact that offending rates fell among other age groups, not just those
born in the 1970s who reached peak offending ages in the early 1990s.
The demographics hypothesis suggests that crime rates fell because of
an aging population. This and many other hypotheses suggest that
crime fell because of a decline or relative decline in either the number
or motivation of offenders, and such hypotheses seem unable to explain
why some crime types, such as phone theft and e-crimes, have in-
creased when others have fallen.
Some criticisms apply to more than one hypothesis, and these are
identiﬁed and used as a series of “tests” to determine if any hypothesis
passes each one. Of research to date it is concluded that only the se-
curity hypothesis passes each test. This hypothesis suggests that crime
fell because of a reduction in crime opportunities caused by improved
security, and this is the focus of Section IV of this essay. There is strong
empirical support for the security hypothesis from independent re-
search into the drop in car theft in four countries, which suggests that
it was caused by improved vehicle security, particularly electronic im-
mobilizers and central deadlocking systems. There is also mounting
evidence that household burglary fell because of improved household
security. It is suggested that while further research is needed, declines
in several other crime types, including shoplifting and some types of
robbery, may also have occurred because of improved security as busi-
ness began to realize the cost of high crime rates. The link is made to
criminal career research, which ﬁnds that most criminal careers are
dominated by property crime and that property crimes are often the
debut crimes that begin a criminal career. If security improvements
have reduced the volume of property crimes, it is suggested that this
may have caused the less prevalent violent crimes to decline also, be-
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cause much violence would likely be linked with acquisitive crime in
some way.
This essay concludes that the security hypothesis, nested in the the-
oretical framework of crime opportunity theory, rational choice, and
routine activities, offers the most likely explanation for why crime has
declined in many countries. On the basis of this conclusion, the main
policy implication is that designing-out crime should be given far
greater prominence: Government and police should seek to encourage
both the public and private sectors to reduce the emission of crime
opportunities. This is likely to require a mix of regulation and market-
based incentives and policing to reemphasize crime prevention as its
primary mission and to give a far greater emphasis to problem-solving
approaches.
Here is a summary of the structure of this essay. Section II examines
the extent and nature of the crime drop. Section III assesses 17 hy-
potheses that have been offered to explain the crime drop and ﬁnds 16
largely wanting. Section IV focuses on the the security hypothesis. It
reviews strong evidence from independent research in multiple coun-
tries that greatly improved security-caused property crime and acquis-
itive crime to fall and that, since they are so prominent, it is possible
that they triggered the fall in violence by various routes. Section V
offers conclusions and recommendations.
The term “crime drop” is used in this essay in the same sense that
it is used in much of the literature. It is a portmanteau term that iden-
tiﬁes broad similarities in downward crime trends since the early 1990s
while acknowledging signiﬁcant variation in their timing, extent, and
nature. Global or international crime trends remain rather elusive be-
cause of data limitations. Reasonable generalizations can nonetheless
be made. Just as local crime patterns vary within countries’ broad gen-
eral national trends, so too can individual countries’ patterns be ex-
pected to vary within broad international trends.
II. Extent and Nature of the Crime Drop
This section gives an overview of key trends and data sources. The
importance of this section is that the evidence it provides underpins
the assessment of the various explanations for the crime drop that have
been offered that are the subject of Section III that follows.
This section shows that there is extensive evidence from multiple
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FIG. 1.—National Crime Victimization Survey crime rates 1976–2012 indexed to 100 in
1976. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
independent sources and methodologies that indicates that crime has
fallen substantially in many countries in recent years. It thereby dem-
onstrates that the crime drop is not an artifact of statistics or method.
A. The United States
Figures 1 and 2 show trends based on the National Crime Victim-
ization Survey (NCVS) and Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), respec-
tively. Homicide, sexual violence, robberies, and assault rates declined
rapidly from the early 1990s. While there has been some ﬂattening of
the trend from around the turn of the century, the crime drop has
continued for two decades. By 2011, violence in the United States had
fallen 70 percent since 1993 according to the NCVS (Truman and
Planty 2012). Household burglary and larceny theft also fell over this
period but had been in decline longer. Between 1973 and 1995, bur-
glary fell by half and theft by 43 percent (Rand, Lynch, and Cantor
1997), trends that continued: burglary fell 56 percent between 1994
and 2011 (Hardison Walters et al. 2013). Figure 2 suggests a strong
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FIG. 2.—UCR violent crime (including homicide) and motor vehicle theft rates per 100,000
population, United States, 1960–2012. Source: Uniform Crime Reports.
relationship between car theft rates and rates of violence with a 2-year
lag.2
B. Canada
There is a remarkable similarity between the UCR of Canada and
those of the United States. These are held to be the best comparative
source for present purposes. The reason is that while Canada conducts
a national victimization survey every 5 years, its ﬁndings relating to
crime trends have been signiﬁcantly questioned and contradict the
ﬁndings of all other sources that crime has been declining in a fashion
similar to the United States. The Canadian national crime survey is
conducted as part of a more general social survey by one part of Sta-
tistics Canada while its ﬁndings seem to have been openly contradicted
by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics that is also part of Sta-
tistics Canada (see Farrell and Brantingham [2013] for further details;
2 The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between auto theft and violent crime rates
from 1960 to 2012 for the UCR is a remarkable .89 (and with a 2-year lag on auto
theft it rises to .92) and .88 for the NCVS covering 1976–2005 as shown in ﬁg. 2.
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see also Greenspan and Doob 2011), and so Canada’s UCR data are
preferred here.
Figure 3 shows a panel of comparative crime trends for the United
States and Canada for roughly similar crime types. Each chart is in-
dexed to 100 in 1962 to facilitate comparison of the trends. This shows
that trends in the homicide rates are very similar over time even though
the per capita homicide rate in the United States is signiﬁcantly higher.
A visual inspection of ﬁgure 3 suggests, and as others including Oui-
met (2002), Zimring (2006), and Mishra and Lalumiere (2009) have
concluded, that there is a strong relationship between crime trends in
Canada and the United States. Burglary in the United States appears
to fall earlier than in Canada. Car theft in Canada falls rather later
than in the United States, and this seems likely to reﬂect differences
in the timing of the introduction of improved vehicle security, an issue
discussed at length later in this essay. Yet it is despite these differences
that the strong similarities in crime trends in the two countries are
apparent.3
C. England and Wales
The United Kingdom has data of good quality. The Crime Survey
for England and Wales (CSEW; formerly the British Crime Survey)
has been conducted since 1982. It identiﬁes a crime drop with timing
similar to that of the United States. Again following around three de-
cades of increasing crime in the post–World War II period, the house-
hold crime rate peaked in 1993 and the personal crime rate in 1995
(ﬁg. 4).4 By 2012, relative to those peaks, all household crime had fallen
64 percent and all violent crime by 56 percent.5 Figure 4, panel B,
shows the rates indexed to 100 at the ﬁrst survey sweep of 1981 to
allow a clearer comparison of change. It demonstrates the similarity in
3 Owing to a deﬁnitional difference, the comparison of rates of rape in the United
States to sexual assault in Canada is not included here, but the chart was broadly similar
in nature to the others with a correlation coefﬁcient of .81.
4 The CSEW category of “all household crime” covers vandalism, burglary, vehicle-
related theft, and bicycle theft, and “all personal crime” covers theft from the person,
other theft of personal property, assault (wounding, assaults with and without injury),
and robbery. Unfortunately, the CSEW does not cover 1994, so the year in which
crime peaked in England and Wales remains undetermined.
5 From 2001 the CSEW coverage changes from a calendar year to be more akin to
a ﬁnancial year. For simplicity this essay refers to the main year, so that, e.g., when
the CSEW refers to 2012/13, here we refer to 2012. This is less cumbersome for
readers, and the same practice is used in chart labels.
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FIG. 3.—Uniform Crime Report data for Canada and the United States, 1962–2010, indexed
to 100 in 1962. Source: Statistics Canada; Bureau of Justice Statistics. A, Homicide; B, theft;
C, burglary.
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FIG. 3 (continued ).—Uniform Crime Report data for Canada and the United States, 1962–
2010, indexed to 100 in 1962. Source: Statistics Canada; Bureau of Justice Statistics.D, Robbery;
E, assault; F, vehicle theft.
FIG. 4.—Household crime and personal crime, England and Wales, 1981–2012. A, Rates per
1,000 households or persons. B, Rates indexed to 100 in 1981. Source: Crime Survey forEngland
and Wales.
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the “crime drop” with the fall in household crimes including motor
vehicle crime slightly preceding that of personal crime. The homicide
rate is an anomaly in England and Wales. Unlike most other crime
types, it continued to rise through the 1990s to a peak in 2002, after
which it fell by half over the subsequent decade (Ofﬁce of National
Statistics 2014).
D. Australia and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand have conducted national victimization
surveys infrequently, so that information is supplemented from other
sources, particularly police-recorded crime, to derive trends. Mayhew
(2012) provides the authoritative review of the range of data sources
and previous studies of crime trends in these countries. She concludes
in relation to property crime that “the pattern of falling property crime
in many industrialized countries in the last two decades or so is mir-
rored, then, in Australia and New Zealand. The timing of the ‘turn’
in property crime seemed to be around 2001 in Australia according to
police ﬁgures. In New Zealand, it was about a decade before—more
in line with other countries” (p. 98). In relation to violent crime, “in
other countries, the picture for violent crime has been more mixed,
although there is evidence of some stabilization in some countries. This
seems to apply to Australia in the last decade and to New Zealand at
least in the previous one” (p. 98).
Among prior studies, Morgan and Clare (2007) focused on house-
hold burglary in Western Australia while suggesting that trends were
generally similar for other states. Following national burglary rate in-
creases of 150 percent between 1973/74 and 1991/92, Western Aus-
tralia experienced further increases of a quarter from 1993 to 1995 then
fell by half between 1995 and 2005. This meant that the overall rate
emerged a third lower in 2005, with Morgan and Clare suggesting that
the decline was similar elsewhere in Australia.
From 2001, vehicle theft in Australia plummeted, falling around
three-quarters over the next decade. Police-recorded crime data for car
theft are generally held to be more reliable than most because incidents
are reported for insurance purposes. Kriven and Ziersch’s inﬂuential
(2007) study examined the early years of this decline and links it
strongly to improved vehicle security. In particular, and consistent with
the work of Brown and Thomas (2003) and Brown (2004) in the
United Kingdom, they ﬁnd an aging of stolen vehicles, which would
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be expected when newer cars are more difﬁcult to steal (see also Lay-
cock [2004] and Webb [2005] in relation to the United Kingdom).
E. The International Crime Victimization Survey
The International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) is the only
cross-national methodologically standardized general victim survey. It
has smaller national sample sizes and hence larger standard errors than
most national surveys. It has been conducted in 1988, 1992, 1996,
2000, 2004–5, and for six countries for 2010 (with the 2010 data sup-
plemented by some complementary studies based on the ICVS
method; see van Dijk 2013). This gives a spread covering more than
two decades but for a maximum of six data points, making short-term
variation less easy to specify. The ICVS reveals a crime drop that is
broadly similar to what has been discussed so far but for a far wider
set of countries. As an independent source, it further buttresses the
evidence of widespread crime declines.
Aebi and Linde (2012) suggest that there is no “general” crime drop
in Europe because of a variation between countries. Few would dis-
agree that there is variation between countries or that there is variation
within countries and across crime types. Whether or not that means it
can be termed a general crime drop is a different issue. Their analysis
uses police records of crime, police records of suspects, and court con-
viction statistics; while the multiple sources are useful, these data
sources are not as appropriate for cross-national and over-time com-
parisons as the multiple survey sources examined by van Dijk and Tse-
loni (2012). Killias and Lanfranconi (2012) suggest, mainly with data
from police and insurers, that Switzerland is the exception to the crime
drop rule, though that conclusion is not borne out by the ICVS, which
shows declines in most crime types in Switzerland (van Dijk et al.
2007). Overall, the preponderance of evidence seems to suggest that it
is reasonable to refer to a general crime drop in Europe.
F. Evidence Relating to Violence against Women and Children
The nation-state has been the main unit of analysis so far, with par-
ticular crime types and groups discussed in that context. This subsec-
tion highlights key crime types or studies that tend to be excluded from
such analysis or are often less comprehensively measured by some of
the large-scale victim surveys.
With respect to violence against women, Kangaspunta and Haen
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Marshall (2012) review data sources and measurement issues relating
to trends in different countries. The methodological issues are myriad
because of the hidden nature of violence against women. Despite those
issues, they conclude that “[there are] some similarities in the violence
against women trends: in all surveyed Western countries, partner vio-
lence is decreasing. Also, homicides against women are decreasing in
nearly all countries, with the exception of Finland where the trend is
stable” (p. 126). These positive ﬁndings were tempered by far more
negative ﬁndings for violence against women in non-Western countries
in particular. In a brief discussion of explanations, the authors suggest
that declining violence against women in Western societies could be
due to greater gender equality, improved resource availability, and
changing relational lifestyles (p. 128). This hypothesis may warrant
further close examination but is not discussed in detail elsewhere in
this essay because there are not, to our knowledge, any existing at-
tempts at empirical evaluation.
Finkelhor and Jones (2012) review evidence from different sources
relating to trends in sexual abuse and physical abuse of children in the
United States. The study was conducted because ofﬁcial sources, par-
ticularly the child protection system data, had been questioned, and so
this review compared such sources to self-report surveys. Our summary
of their ﬁndings, shown as table 1, gives very brief coverage of a lot
of information and methodological issues that are covered in detail in
the original studies and by Finkelhor and Jones (2004, 2006). The
conclusion of Finkelhor and Jones is worth repeating at length:
There is fairly consistent and convergent evidence from a variety
of sources pointing to large declines in sexual abuse from 1992 to
2010. The idea that child protection system data is a misleading
indicator on this trend is contradicted by the fact that the decline
shows up in other sources that do not rely on CPS. The NIS [Na-
tional Incident Study] study is particularly important because it
uses consistent criteria across time, and conﬁrms the child protec-
tion system trends. The self-report surveys are also very important
because they represent victim testimony itself. It seems unlikely
that, in the face of more public attention to sexual abuse and de-
creasing stigma, youth would be more reluctant to disclose in sur-
veys. In fact one study shows greater reporting of sexual abuse to
the authorities, but that the evidence relating to physical abuse is
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TABLE 1
Abuse of Children, United States: Summary of Change in Crime Rates
Source Deﬁnition Period
Rate
Change (%)
A. Sexual Abuse
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Substantiated sexual abuse 1990–2010 62
National Incident Study Sexual abuse 1993–2005 47
Federal Bureau of Investigation Forcible rape 1990–2010 35
National Crime Victimization Survey Sexual assault against ages 12–17 1993–2008 69
Minnesota School Survey Sexual abuse 1992–2010 29
National Survey of Family Growth Statutory rape 1995–2008 39
National Survey of Children Exposed to Violence Sexual victimization 2003–8 16
National Survey of Adolescents Sexual assault—girls
Sexual assault—boys
1995–2005
1995–2005
13 (NS)
9 (NS)
B. Physical Abuse
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Substantiated physical abuse 1990–2009 56
National Incidence Study Physical abuse 1993–2005 29
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National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child maltreatment fatalities (“majority
are neglect and not physical abuse”)
1993–2007 46
Federal Bureau of Investigation Homicide—children 0–17
Homicide—children 0–5
1997–2007
1997–2007
43
26
Acute-care hospital admissions Children ! age 1
Children 1–18 admissions
1997–2009
1997–2009
10.9
9.1
Admissions to 38-hospital sample Children age ! 6
Children ! age 1 (brain injury)
2000–2009
2000–2009
.79
3
National Survey of Children Exposed to Violence Physical abuse by caregivers 2003–8
National Survey of Adolescents Physical abuse 1995–2005 6 (NS)
Minnesota School Survey Physical abuse 1992–2010 20
National Crime Victimization Survey Ages 12–17—simple assault 1992–2010 59
Ages 12–17—aggravated assault 1992–2010 69
SOURCE.—Finklehor and Jones (2012).
NOTE.—NS indicates ﬁndings that were not statistically signiﬁcant.
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less clear and sometimes conﬂicting. (Finkelhor and Jones 2012, p.
3)
Finkelhor and Jones (2012, p. 3) conclude that the evidence of a
decline in sexual abuse of children “is about as well established as crime
trends can be in contemporary social science,” which means that the
evidence is compelling. Their review of trends in the physical abuse of
children is slightly less conclusive, ﬁnding greater variation in the
trends identiﬁed by different data sources (panel B of table 1). How-
ever, they conclude that the preponderance of evidence suggests that
physical abuse of children has also declined, with the most methodo-
logically rigorous evidence coming from the NIS: “The strongest evi-
dence that overall physical abuse has declined is the evidence from the
NIS. This study was speciﬁcally designed to monitor rates and it is
unique in its use of exactly consistent criteria across time points” (p.
5).
G. Conclusion
This section painted a broad-brush picture of the nature of recent
crime trends. It suggests that there is compelling evidence for the fol-
lowing conclusions:
• There has been a signiﬁcant and prolonged “crime drop” in many
industrialized nations.
• The extent and nature of the crime drop appear to be more sim-
ilar between more similar countries (in Canada and the United
States, e.g., there are marked similarities).
• The extent of the evidence means that the likelihood that crime
drops in different countries are a coincidence is vanishingly small,
which implies a causal link.
• These crime drops were generally preceded by several decades of
rapidly rising crime.
While many common crimes have decreased, some, such as crimes
facilitated by the Internet and theft of phones and similar electronic
products, have increased. These conclusions are the basis for the as-
sessment of explanations for the crime drop in Section III that follows.
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III. Proposed Explanations
This section examines the competing explanations for the crime drop.
The focus is those hypotheses that have been given some attention in
the academic literature. The extent of supporting evidence varies by
hypothesis, and some attempt is made to address this in what follows.
Each hypothesis is subjected to four evidence-based tests founded
on the conclusions of the preceding section. It is proposed that each
test must be passed for a hypothesis to be considered potentially viable.
However, passing the four tests is considered a necessary but not a
sufﬁcient condition for a viable explanation of why crime has declined.
The tests are straightforward, and variations on existing evaluation cri-
teria. Part of their value lies in sidestepping many of the methodolog-
ical dogﬁghts in which some hypotheses appeared to be mired.
The assessment that follows ﬁnds that 16 of the 17 hypotheses fail
one or more of the four tests. This is often in addition to other crit-
icisms that have been leveled against them. The hypothesis that passes
the tests is the security hypothesis. That hypothesis is covered only
brieﬂy in this section because it is the focus of Section IV of this essay.
A summary of the results of applying the four tests to the hypotheses
is given in table 3 below, but it is discussed at the end of this section.
A. The Identiﬁcation of Crime Drop Hypotheses
The literature does not uniformly refer to a “crime drop” by that or
a similar term and so, while it is hoped that the list of hypotheses in
table 2 is comprehensive, others may exist. However, the four tests
outlined here can be applied elsewhere.
Seventeen hypotheses are listed in table 2 with a brief description of
each. Some potential hypotheses are not included here if they are
largely speculative, that is, without supporting evidence, or if they lack
a clear preventive mechanism or a reasonable chance of withstanding
further scrutiny. For example, Farrell et al. (2010) speculated on what
might be termed a “Jeffreys effect”: the possibility that DNA ﬁnger-
printing, which began in the 1980s but spread most rapidly in advanced
countries in the early 1990s and gained a lot of media attention, could
have introduced a broad deterrent effect. Since there is not, to our
knowledge, any further research on this issue, it is not included in table
2 even though, strictly speaking, it could still attract further research.
Some crime drop studies that provide useful insight are not included
in table 2 if they do not offer a distinct causal hypothesis. This includes
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TABLE 2
Crime Drop Hypotheses
Hypothesis Summary
1. Strong economy General economic improvement reduced
crime
2. Concealed weapons laws More concealed weapons increased deter-
rence
3. Capital punishment Increased use of death penalty induced
greater deterrence
4. Gun control laws Gun control reduced crime due to gun con-
trol laws
5. Imprisonment Increased imprisonment reduced crime via
incapacitation and deterrence
6. Policing strategies Better preventive policing reduced crime
(i.e., Compstat and its progeny)
7. More police Police staff increased, so crime fell
8. Legalization of abortion Abortions in 1970s meant fewer at-risk ado-
lescents in 1990s
9. Immigration Immigrants commit less crime and promote
social control in inner cities
10. Consumer conﬁdence Strong economy shifts consumers away from
stolen secondhand goods
11. Declining hard-drug markets Decline in hard-drug markets reduced re-
lated violence and property crime
12. Lead poisoning Lead damaged children’s brains in 1950s on,
causing crime wave from 1960s when they
reached adolescence; then cleaner air from
1970s caused crime drop of 1990s
13. Changing demographics Aging population means proportionally fewer
young offenders and victims, so crime
rates fall
14. Civilizing process Institutional control weakened in 1960s,
causing crime increase, then strengthened
in 1990s, causing crime drop
15. Improved security Improved quality and quantity of security re-
duced crime opportunities
16. The Internet Attractive displacement of offenders to
e-crimes and changed lifestyles of victims
17. Phone guardianship Portable phones spread rapidly in 1990s and
provide guardianship
some empirical studies with important ﬁndings. Thus Mishra and La-
lumiere’s (2009) examination of how many types of declining risky
behavior (such as accidents at work or in cars, sexual behavior including
teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and substance use
including alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana) correlate with the decline
in crime is insightful and informative but does not constitute a distinct
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hypothesis. Similarly, studies showing that the crime decline is dispro-
portionately concentrated in high-crime areas relative to others (Weis-
burd et al. 2004; Curman, Andresen, and Brantingham 2014; Ignatans
and Pease, forthcoming) and the fact that crime declines are dispro-
portionately experienced for repeat victimization against the same tar-
gets (Thorpe 2007; Britton et al. 2012; Farrell and Pease 2014) are not
explanations per se. In each of these cases, however, it would be ex-
pected that a viable hypothesis should be consistent with these ﬁndings,
and while this is not included here as a separate requirement or “test,”
each warrants consideration in that respect. The ordering and termi-
nology of the table are based on that of Farrell (2013). For simplicity
in cross-referencing, the sections below use the numberings assigned
in table 2.
B. Four Tests for a Theory of the Crime Drop
The four tests are ﬁrst outlined here. Clariﬁcation of the origins and
speciﬁcs of each test should emerge from what follows. The tests, with
brief justiﬁcation for each that should become clearer as the tests are
applied to the hypotheses, are described brieﬂy here.
1. The Cross-National Test. Can the hypothesis be applied to differ-
ent countries (e.g., to Canada for hypotheses developed for the United
States)?
The basis for this test is the earlier conclusions that a crime drop
has occurred in multiple countries and that this cannot be a coinci-
dence. Marc Ouimet’s comparative studies of crime in Canada and the
United States identiﬁed not only strong correlations between the crime
rates in these two counties but also key implications for crime drop
research. He observes that
crime trends in Canada are very similar to those observed in the
U.S. The quest for a general explanation should therefore focus on
changes that have affected both countries. . . . If changes in the
use of incarceration is to be invoked as an explanation, it would
have to be shown why it worked in the U.S. but not in Canada. In
terms of policing, contrary to the U.S., Canada has not increased
the pro rata number of police ofﬁcers . . . [and] there has been no
move toward more aggressive policing as was observed in many
U.S. cities. (Ouimet 2002, p. 46)
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Zimring, shortly before publication of his book The Great American
Crime Decline, declared his epiphany as follows:
Closer inspection showed that the timing of the Canadian decline
(1991–2000) ﬁt perfectly with the timing of the declining in the
United States. The extraordinary similarity of these trends in
breadth, magnitude, and timing suggested that whatever was driv-
ing the decline in the United States was also operating in Canada.
. . . But . . . Canada in the 1990s didn’t increase its imprisonment,
didn’t hire more police per 100,000 population, and didn’t have
anything close to the economic boom we enjoyed south of the
border. (2006, p. 619)
Others have made similar observations outside of North America.
Van Dijk et al. (2007) and Rosenfeld and Messner (2009), for example,
both observed that crime drops in Europe cannot be due to policy or
legislation in the United States. Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008)
similarly conclude that we “know little about the empirically relevant
determinants of crime. This conclusion applies both to policy variables
like arrest rates or capital punishment and to indirect factors such as
abortion or gun laws. The reason is that even hypotheses that ﬁnd
some support in U.S. data for recent decades are inconsistent with data
over longer horizons or across countries. Thus, these hypotheses are
less persuasive than a focus on recent U.S. evidence might suggest” (p.
3).
Hindsight is 20/20, and the preference here is to celebrate the pi-
oneering nature of crime drop research focused on the United States
while noting the general dearth of research elsewhere until rather later
(Ouimet being among the honorable exceptions). However, the key
point is that the evidence suggests that a hypothesis should be appli-
cable in different countries to warrant serious consideration, and any
that does not, without appropriate justiﬁcation, should be considered
suspect. This is the basis for what is here termed the cross-national
test.
2. The Prior Crime Increase Test. Is the hypothesis consistent, or at
least not in contradiction, with the fact that crime was previously gen-
erally increasing for several decades?
The basis for this test is the earlier conclusion that, prior to the
crime drop, crime in most advanced countries had been rising in pre-
vious decades: it is fair to say that there is scientiﬁc consensus on this
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issue. The extent and duration of crime increases varied, as with crime’s
more recent decline, and some evidence relating to some of the prior
crime increase was touched on earlier in this essay. In short, any ex-
planation for why crime has declined should not be in contradiction
with the fact that crime was previously rapidly increasing. This may
sound rather obvious and straightforward, but as the discussion of hy-
potheses below suggests, it is a test that is failed surprisingly often.
3. The e-Crimes and Phone Theft Test. Is the hypothesis consistent,
or at least not in contradiction, with the fact that some crime types
have been increasing while many have fallen?
The basis for this test is the fact that some types or subtypes of
crime have increased during the “crime drop” when many crime types
have decreased. The United Kingdom appears to have been ahead of
the game in collating national crime survey data on phone theft since
the 1990s and police data, at least for metropolitan London, since the
early 2000s after the establishment of the National Mobile Phone
Crime Unit. Mayhew and Harrington’s (2001) landmark study shows
how phone theft increased in the 1990s in Britain. Yet it is now in-
creasingly recognized that phone theft and robbery, and theft of similar
portable electronic products including laptops and tablet computers,
have been increasing in many countries. It was observed that “in 2013,
3.1 million people [in the United States] reported their smartphones
stolen, up from 1.6 in 2012. More people are misplacing their smart-
phones, too; last year, 1.4 million Americans lost their smartphones,
up from 1.2 million in 2012” (Lowe 2014; reporting information from
Consumer Reports [2014]) and “mobile device theft costs consumers
$30,000,000,000 [$30 billion] each year according to the Federal Com-
munications Commission” (Smartphone Theft Prevention Act of 2014
[HR 4065]). There is also strong evidence that e-crimes of various sorts
relating to the Internet have increased in recent years. Clarke and
Newman (2006), for example, examined e-commerce crime.
These increases in some crime subtypes run against the grain of the
“crime drop.” What is here termed the “e-crimes and phone theft test”
is consequently straightforward. It proposes that any hypothesis should
be consistent with this fact, or at least not contradict it. Again, this
may sound obvious when viewed in isolation, but many of the crime
drop hypotheses focus primarily on change in the number or motiva-
tion of potential offenders. If crime fell as a result of a change in
demographics, abortion, or lead poisoning, which primarily reduced
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the number or motivation of offenders, then it might reasonably be
expected that this would reduce all types of crime similarly. This is
particularly true when it comes to phone thefts and robbery, which
have increased. Theft and robbery have declined overall, but, because
of phone thefts and robbery, perhaps less than other types of crime.
4. The Variable Trajectories Test. Is the hypothesis compatible, or at
least not in contradiction, with variation in the timing, trajectory, and
composition of crime falls both between countries and between crime
types?
The basis for this test is the earlier evidence-based conclusion that
there has been signiﬁcant variation between and within countries in
the nature of the crime drop. While the cross-national test implied an
emphasis on the broad similarity in the fact that crime has declined
signiﬁcantly in different countries, the present test emphasizes differ-
ences within that picture. For instance, homicide in the United King-
dom did not begin its steep decline until considerably after the drop
in most other crime types examined here. Likewise, in the United
States, the NCVS identiﬁes burglary and theft as having been in de-
cline for around two decades before the major decline in auto theft
and violence began. Similarly, there were signiﬁcant differences in the
timing of the crime drop in Australia and between the trends in prop-
erty and violent crime in both Australia and New Zealand. Hence
within the overall “crime drop,” there are a range of signiﬁcant differ-
ences. The variable trajectories test proposes that any explanation of
the crime drop must be compatible with, or at least not in contradiction
of, this evidence.
C. Review of Hypotheses
This subsection examines the 17 hypotheses in turn. Its sequence
follows that of the listing of hypotheses in tables 2 and 3.
Hypotheses 1–4: Strong Economy, Concealed Weapons Laws, Capital Pun-
ishment, and Gun Control Laws. It has been suggested that crime fell
because economies in the 1990s were growing rapidly, that laws allow-
ing concealed weapons generated deterrence and guardianship, that the
application of the death penalty deterred crime, and that stricter gun
control laws meant that weapons were less freely available for use in
crime.
Those four hypotheses are, on the basis of previous research, taken
to be falsiﬁed. They were dismissed in two key reviews of crime drop
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research, being either formally discarded on the basis of the evidence
offered in Levitt (2004) or implicitly dismissed by their absence from
consideration in the review of Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008).
For symmetry these hypotheses will be considered in relation to the
other four tests, though it is not coincidental that they largely fail
them. Many advanced countries had strong economies in the 1990s,
and so that hypothesis is taken to pass the cross-national test. However,
concealed weapons laws, increased use of the death penalty, and weak
gun control laws are largely particular to the United States among
advanced countries. They fail the cross-national test because legislation
speciﬁc to that country is not responsible for reducing crime in the
range of other countries experiencing the crime drop.
The basis for the original proposals that concealed weapons laws,
capital punishment, and gun control laws may have caused the crime
drop was that there appeared to be some ﬁt in their timing. That is,
although they may have subsequently been proved otherwise, they ap-
peared to have some initial ﬁt with the prior crime increase test. How-
ever, they do not appear consistent with the fact that some crime types
have increased and fail the e-crime and phone theft test. Likewise, they
all offer little by means of explaining differences in the timing of the
crime drop between crime types or in the timing and trajectories be-
tween countries, and so they fail the variable trajectories test.
Hypothesis 5: Imprisonment. The possibility that increased impris-
onment caused the crime drop is a hypothesis developed in relation to
the United States. However, a recent National Research Council report
notes that “over the four decades when incarceration rates steadily rose,
U.S. crime rates showed no clear trend: the rate of violent crime rose,
then fell, rose again, then declined sharply” (2014, p. 3). It concludes
that “the increase in incarceration may have caused a decrease in crime,
but the magnitude of the reduction is highly uncertain and the results
of most studies suggest it was unlikely to have been large” (p. 4). This
differs from some earlier ﬁndings, perhaps most notably the work of
Spelman (2000), which suggested that a quarter of the crime drop in
the United States was due to increased use of imprisonment.
Cross-national comparative analysis sheds useful light on the im-
prisonment hypothesis. Zimring’s critique relating to neighboring Ca-
nada, where imprisonment policy is very different, cited earlier, was
telling. According to van Dijk et al.,
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Prison populations have since the early nineties gone up in many
EU countries but not consistently so. Between 1995 and 2000
rates went down, for example, in Sweden, France, Poland and Fin-
land (European Sourcebook, 2003). Sentencing policies in Europe
as a whole are considerably less punitive than in the USA (Far-
rington, Langan, and Tonry, 2004) and yet crime is falling just as
steeply in Europe as it is in the USA. No relationship between the
severity of sentencing of countries and trends in national levels of
crime is therefore in evidence. (Van Dijk et al. 2007, p. 23)
Rosenfeld and Messner (2009) add weight to this conclusion with
their comparative analysis of European and American imprisonment
rates, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant relationship. Hence, it is fair to conclude
that the imprisonment hypothesis fails the cross-national comparative
test and thereby, via comparison with Canada in particular, also further
impugns the hypothesis in relation to the United States. Further, the
major increases in imprisonment that occurred in the United States
before the crime drop occurred suggest that the imprisonment hy-
pothesis fails what is here termed the prior crime increase test. Like-
wise, if imprisonment caused crime to drop, it is not apparent why
phone theft or e-crimes would increase when other crimes fell, or how
it might account for variation in the timing and trajectory of crime
trends in different countries, and so it fails the third and fourth tests.
Overall, there is little evidence that imprisonment played much, if any,
role in the crime drop even in the United States, and no evidence that
it played a role in most other countries experiencing a crime drop.
Hypotheses 6 and 7: Policing Strategies and More Police. Eck and Ma-
guire’s (2000) review of police numbers and policing strategy concludes
that there is no real evidence supporting the notion that policing
caused the crime drop. This is consistent with Bowling’s (1999) study
of New York City. However, a key role for policing in New York City
has been claimed (Kelling and Sousa 2001), though while Zimring
(2012) suggests that policing was a cause of the crime drop, he does
not appear to identify the precise mechanism by which it is meant to
have occurred. Ouimet (2002) summarizes the critical issues: “The
main problem with the policing explanation is that innovative police
practices such as gun patrols (stop and frisk) or Compstat type systems
had been implemented after the crime rate had already begun declin-
ing. Moreover, the rate of crime dropped in cities that had not expe-
rienced major changes in policing” (p. 39). Note that this does not
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mean that policing strategies cannot affect crime. There is clear evi-
dence that they can in some instances, particularly when resources are
focused where crime is concentrated, and especially by use of problem-
oriented policing focused on repeat victimization (Grove et al. 2012)
or target crime hot spots (Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2012). Sim-
ilarly, there is also evidence that increased police numbers may reduce
the crime rate (Lin 2009). However, this is a different issue and does
not overcome the timing problem noted above.
Both policing hypotheses also fail the cross-national test because
other countries did not experience the increases in police numbers, or
changes in strategies, that were proposed as causal for the United
States. Similarly, if policing had induced the drop in many types of
street crime, this could reasonably be expected to similarly have an
impact on phone theft, and so it fails the fourth test. Neither policing
hypothesis appears compatible with the variations in the timing and
trajectory of declines in crime exhibited between countries and crime
types, and so they fail the fourth test.
Hypothesis 8: Legalization of Abortion. Donohue and Levitt (2001)
proposed that the legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973
was a cause of the crime drop. They argued that legalized abortion
reduced the number of births of children who would otherwise be most
at risk of becoming offenders in their teenage years. The evidence and
methodology of this work have been revised and updated and remain
signiﬁcantly disputed, most notably by Joyce (2009, 2011). In partic-
ular, it is not clear that Cook and Laub’s (2002, p. 23) criticism has
been addressed. They concluded that “the timing of the downturn is
simply wrong for legalized abortion to be the driving force” of the
crime drop. They argue that the age cohorts that would experience
reduced offending do not coincide with the timing of the crime drop.
Thus Cook and Laub suggest that the crime drop must be due to
period effects, that is, something changed at around the time that crime
dropped rather than many years earlier. This is a signiﬁcant criticism
that also applies to the lead poisoning hypothesis addressed later in
this essay. The point is reiterated by Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008)
in their review for the National Research Council. They conclude that
“the important omitted variables in the initial analysis and the repli-
cations showing no signiﬁcant effect suggest that any such effect [of
this hypothesis] is likely to be quite small” (p. 27).
Once again, cross-national comparative analysis sheds signiﬁcant fur-
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ther light on the validity of this hypothesis. An in-depth analysis of
abortion rates and crime in the United Kingdom (Kahane, Paton, and
Simmons 2008) could identify no evidence to support the hypothesis
in that country, and Zimring (2007) suggests that this is true elsewhere.
Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008) compare homicide rate trends from
around 20 countries to the timing of abortion legalization laws. They
conclude that “while the data from some countries are consistent with
the [abortion legalization] hypothesis (e.g. Canada, France, Italy),
several countries’ data show the opposite correlation (e.g. Denmark,
Finland, Hungary, Poland). In other cases crime was falling before
legalization and does not decline any more quickly (20 years) after
legalization (e.g. Japan, Norway)” (p. 17). Hence the hypothesis ap-
pears to fail the cross-national test. It can be taken to pass the prior
crime increase test for present purposes since the purported ﬁt with
the timing of the crime drop is its key feature. However, it fails the
phone theft and e-crimes test because, if abortion reduced crime across
such a wide range of crime types, it is unclear why it would not also
affect these crime types (phone theft in particular). Similarly, the tim-
ing of its effect would be expected to be somewhat uniform, and so it
cannot account for the variations detailed in relation to the variable
trajectories test even within the United States, where burglary and theft
had been declining for signiﬁcantly longer than violent crime. Overall,
the preponderance of evidence suggests that the abortion hypothesis
contributes little, if anything, to explanations of crime’s decline.
Hypothesis 9: Immigration. The notion that immigration might have
induced the crime drop appears to have been ﬂoated in a news article
by Sampson (2006) and furthered in Sampson (2008). In a more ex-
tensive empirical examination of the immigration hypothesis, Stowell
et al. (2009) claim that it accounts for 6 percent of the crime drop.
For present purposes, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
it is assumed that other countries have had immigration experiences
with an effect similar to that of the United States, and so it is taken
to pass the cross-national test. However, that assumption requires
closer examination in further study because the nature of immigration
in other countries is likely to be rather different in terms of both vol-
ume and the origins of immigrants. Unless the effect is the same for
immigrants of all origins, which does not seem to be a proposition of
studies focused on the United States, then it is quite possible that this
hypothesis fails the cross-national test.
Why the Crime Drop? 447
FIG. 5.—Number of persons naturalized annually in the United States (plus exponential trend
line with R2p .88). Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics
2013, table 20.
Just as it was suggested that policing strategies can reduce crime but
do not appear to have caused the crime drop, so it is possible that
immigration may reduce crime in some instances but not account for
the crime drop. There does seem to be evidence that immigration can
reduce crime (see Martinez and Mehlman-Orozco 2013), but the evi-
dence that immigration caused the crime drop appears less persuasive.
In particular, while immigration in the United States may have in-
creased in the 1990s, it was also increasing prior to the 1990s, when
crime was increasing rapidly. This suggests that this hypothesis fails
the prior crime increase test. Figure 5 shows the number of persons
naturalized annually in the United States between 1960 and 2013. The
signiﬁcant increase in the 1990s is clear, though uneven, and it does
not track (inversely) the decline in crime in any clear fashion. Perhaps
more importantly, the trend in immigration prior to the 1990s, using
naturalization as the proxy here, was also upward when crime was in-
creasing. Why, if immigration reduces crime, was crime increasing so
rapidly for several decades previously? It may suggest that while im-
migration may have increased more rapidly in the 1990s in the United
448 Graham Farrell, Nick Tilley, and Andromachi Tseloni
States, the relationship with rapidly decreasing crime may be somewhat
spurious. At the very least this issue may warrant further examination.
Aspects of two other key studies seem to lend weight to this suspicion:
perhaps tellingly, Sampson’s analysis (2008; see chart on p. 29) begins
in 1990 and uses a 3-year average to iron out the large annual variation
in immigration, while Stowell et al.’s (2009) pooled time-series analysis
appears to consider the crime and immigration relationship only after
1994.
If immigration caused the crime drop, then it is unclear why it would
affect differentially phone theft or e-crime, and so it fails the phone
theft and e-crimes test. Similarly, it does not appear to accommodate
the variable trajectories of crime in different countries and for different
crime types, and so it fails the fourth test. Hence while we despise the
xenophobia that immigration seems to bring out in some sections of
society, immigration seems unlikely to underpin much, if any, of the
crime drop.
Hypothesis 10: Consumer Conﬁdence and Price Inﬂation. Rosenfeld
(2009) and Rosenfeld and Messner (2009) proposed the consumer con-
ﬁdence hypothesis as the cause of the decline in violence in the United
States. They suggested that consumer conﬁdence increased when the
economy was strong in the 1990s, causing consumers to move away
from purchasing in secondhand markets that support the stolen goods
trade, the converse being true when consumer conﬁdence was less
strong. They hypothesized that this reduction in property crimes
moved offenders away from risky activity more generally such that it
also caused the reduction in violence. However, the trend in violence
is tracked rather better by auto theft than by an aggregate set of prop-
erty crimes (as ﬁg. 2 implies), and so the evidence underpinning the
hypothesis is questionable. It also seems that since the global economic
downturn in 2008–9 when consumer conﬁdence has declined, the
crime drop has continued, thereby appearing to falsify this hypothesis.
Consumer conﬁdence in many other countries may not have been as
strong as that in the United States in the 1990s but can be taken to
be moving in the same direction for present purposes, such that the
hypothesis passes the cross-national test. However, while economies
were particularly strong in the 1990s, they were also strong for signif-
icant periods prior to that when crime was increasing rapidly in the
post–World War II period, and so the hypothesis does not pass the
prior crime increase test. Similarly, the hypothesis does not appear to
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FIG. 6.—Annual inﬂation rate, United States, 1960–2013. Source: US inﬂation calculator,
http://www.usinﬂationcalculator.com/inﬂation/historical-inﬂation-rates, accessed June 4, 2014.
offer an explanation for why some crimes increased when many de-
creased or for the variation in the crime drop between countries and
crime types, and so it fails the third and fourth tests.
In a further iteration of the work, Rosenfeld (2013) proposed that
crime is linked to inﬂation via a mechanism similar to the purchasing
of stolen goods. Inﬂation rates are suggested to have declined across
several countries studied, and they remained low when crime also re-
mained low during the global economic downturn. The essence of the
supporting evidence for hypothesis 10 is that “as inﬂation rates began
to fall in the early 1990s, so did crime rates in both Europe and the
United States” (p. 2). Data from 1982 onward are analyzed, and the
annual change in consumer prices for eight nations is compared to that
of homicide, robbery, and burglary, with some possible correlation evi-
dent. A limitation of the research is identiﬁed as follows: “the empirical
base for the current ﬁndings is limited by and large to a period of
falling inﬂation and crime rates. It would have been desirable to
broaden temporal coverage to capture the equally precipitous rise in
prices and crime that began in the 1960s” (p. 21). It is possible to
overcome this limitation, at least for the United States. Figure 6 shows
the annual inﬂation rate for the United States for 1960–2013.
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In addition to the trend in inﬂation, two vertical lines have been
added to ﬁgure 6. The ﬁrst indicates 1982, which is the start date for
the analysis underpinning the inﬂation hypothesis. The second indi-
cates 1991, which is when the violent crime drop is typically identiﬁed
as beginning in the United States. The inﬂation rate does appear to
be higher, on average, between 1982 and 1990 than it was after 1990.
However, the annual inﬂation rate before 1982 is telling. The chart
suggests that, for the United States at least, a possible correlation be-
tween inﬂation and crime that may exist in recent years is likely spu-
rious: inﬂation fell dramatically from 1980, which was a decade or more
before violent crime fell. By this analysis the “crime and inﬂation”
hypothesis appears to fail the prior crime increase test, and the impli-
cation is that, as with the consumer conﬁdence hypothesis, it may be
founded on a somewhat selective analysis.
Hypothesis 11: Waning Illicit Drug Markets. The waning crack mar-
ket hypothesis appeared a strong contender in the United States (e.g.,
Blumstein and Wallman 2006; Blumstein and Rosenfeld 2008). A wan-
ing illicit heroin market has been suggested to account for a quarter
or more of the crime drop in Europe (Morgan 2014). Use of these
drugs increased in the 1980s, then declined in the 1990s, and so cannot
account for the similar crime trends before and after. If improved se-
curity (discussed below) made acquisitive crimes harder to commit, this
may have induced declines in the hard-drug markets. It is also unclear
why phone theft and e-crimes would increase if most other types of
crime fell as a result of the waning illicit drug market, and so it fails
the third test. In addition, it is unclear how a declining crack market
could explain variable trajectories in different countries and crime
types, and so it fails the variable trajectories test.
Hypothesis 12: Lead Poisoning. Lead is a poison that can damage the
brain of humans when ingested, with children particularly susceptible.
From this foundation, Nevin’s (2000) study in the United States pos-
ited that lead poisoning of children led to violent crime when they
became adolescents. His work was extended by Stretesky and Lynch
(2001, 2004) to include property crime (see also Reyes 2007, 2012).
The evidence suggests that, with a 22-year delay, there is a strong
aggregate correlation between lead exposure and the rates of some
crime types. Following environmental laws requiring cleaner air and
the removal of lead from petroleum gasoline in particular, this poison-
ing declined, and so, goes the theory, did crime 22 years or so later. A
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recent statement examining only lead compared to assault rates sum-
marizes the lead hypothesis as holding “that present period rates of
adult violence are associated with spatial and temporal variation in
childhood [lead] exposure, linked together by the behavioral and cog-
nitive mechanisms of impulsivity, aggressivity, and depressed IQ”
(Mielke and Zahran 2012, p. 49). Nevin (2007) extended the analysis
to a series of developed countries where lead appeared to correlate with
crime many years later, such that the hypothesis can be said to pass
the cross-national test.
As with abortion legalization, Cook and Laub (2002) deﬁne the lead
poisoning hypothesis as a “cohort explanation” for the crime drop. Its
effect should be produced primarily on the cohort that reaches ado-
lescence at the time when crime begins to fall. They offer evidence
showing that the crime drop was not experienced solely as the product
of a single cohort, but that the range of age cohorts of offenders, in-
cluding older offenders, experienced a reduction in offending rates at
this time. Similarly, in their review for the National Research Council,
Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) also seem to dismiss the lead poison-
ing hypothesis, suggesting that “there is a clear similarity between time
trends in environmental lead levels and violent crime rates lagged by
23 years. But demographic trends—the arrival and waning of the baby
boom generation from the high crime ages—coincided roughly with
the arrival and departure of leaded gasoline, and so the apparent effect
of exposure to lead on crime rates may be confounded with demo-
graphic change” (p. 27).
Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008) apply a longer-term version of
what is here termed the prior crime increase test. They identify mul-
tiple measures of lead exposure for the United States dating from 1910
and conclude that “all proxies for lead increased dramatically from
around 1910 through 1970. If the lead hypothesis is correct, then crime
should have displayed a measurable increase between 1925 and 1985.
The U.S. murder rate, however, decreased between the 1930s and
1950s. The murder rate does rise from the 1960s through the mid-
1970s, but much unexplained variation remains between the mid-1970s
and mid-1980s” (p. 16).
The prior crime increase test identiﬁes a further issue, which is that
lead poisoning is really a hypothesis of why crime increased before the
fall. It is a theory of the crime drop only in its absence. Hence the
hypothesis appears to claim to explain all major trends in crime over
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the last 50 years or so. In so doing it implies that routine activity theory
does not offer the compelling explanation for the post–World War II
crime increases, as most convincingly argued by Cohen and Felson
(1979).
The lead poisoning hypothesis also appears incompatible with recent
increases in phone thefts and robbery as well as Internet-related crime.
Why would they experience such large increases at a time when the
hypothesis suggests that the number of motivated offenders is sharply
declining? Hence the hypothesis seems to fail the phone theft and e-
crimes test. In addition, the lead poisoning hypothesis appears to fail
the variable trajectories test. It is unclear how it would explain some
within-country variations. Violent and property crimes fall simulta-
neously in some countries but at different times or at different rates
in others. If the cause of both really is lead poisoning, then the patterns
ought to be similar. Yet if the lead hypothesis applies only to violent
crime, as implied by the omission of property crime by some studies,
then how would it explain the drop in property crime? As a speciﬁc
example, why would auto theft in the United States fall before violent
crime? And why would homicide in England and Wales begin to plum-
met only several years after the decline in many other types of common
crime including other types of violence? Hence while some of the cor-
relations between levels of lead in the air and some crime rates a couple
of decades later are quite compelling, the overall evidence implies that
these may be spurious and that while lead is clearly a nasty poison, it
does not seem to explain the crime drop.
Hypothesis 13: Changing Demographics. It is well known that most
advanced countries are experiencing an aging population. Hence the
fact that it is easily understood may be the basis for a popular belief
that demographic change induced the crime drop. If the population is
aging, then the proportion of younger people who constitute those
most at risk as both victims and offenders will decline and so too will
per capita crime rates.
In their review for the National Research Council, Blumstein and
Rosenfeld (2008) give the demographics hypothesis short shrift, ob-
serving that “during the sharp crime drop of the 1990s, age composi-
tion changes were trending in the wrong direction: the number of 18-
year-olds in the U.S. population was increasing while crime rates were
declining for other reasons” (p. 20). This contradicts some earlier stud-
ies, perhaps most notably that by Fox (2000), which suggested that
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demographic change accounted for perhaps 10–15 percent of the crime
drop. Hence the demographics hypothesis is included here but is likely
to account for a small proportion of the crime drop at most. It passes
the cross-national test since aging is occurring in many advanced coun-
tries and for present purposes is assumed to pass the prior crime in-
crease test, though the turning point and rate of change in crime seem
too sharp to be due to demographics.
If demographic change caused rates of crime to change, then it
would not be expected that rates of some particular types of theft,
notably phone theft, as well as fraud and other crime conducted via
the Internet, would increase, and so it fails the phone theft and e-
crimes test. In addition, since demographic change might be expected
to affect crime types somewhat uniformly within a country, it does not
appear to account for within-country variations across crime types and
so fails the fourth test.
Hypothesis 14: The Civilizing Process. The “civilizing process hy-
pothesis” is derived from the work of Norbert Elias ([1939] 2000).
Elias’s study is not about crime as we are discussing it here. The book’s
focus is largely feudalism and medievalism. Its 45 chapters cover,
among other things, developments in each of going to the bathroom,
blowing one’s nose, spitting, and behavior in the bedroom. A nine-
page chapter on “Changes in Aggressiveness” is mainly about the joys
of battle and hunting and is closely followed by “The Life of a Knight.”
The index notes two references to violence: “The civilizing process
does not follow a straight line. . . . But if we consider the movement
over large time spans, we see clearly how the compulsions arising di-
rectly from the threat of weapons and physical force have gradually
diminished, and how those forms of dependency which lead to the
regulation of the affects in the form of self-control, gradually in-
creased” (p. 157). The reference to “large time spans” is telling. It
refers to a very gradual change over the centuries rather than to rapid
change over the course of a few years, which is our focus here. More
speciﬁcally, there is no identiﬁed mechanism in Elias’s work that could
explain the recent changes in crime.
Eisner (2008) gives Elias’s work a criminological voice by linking it
to evidence of declining violence over the centuries. Yet Eisner is skep-
tical about applying the civilizing process to the post-1990 crime drop,
noting problems: “not the least of which is whether such a theoretical
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perspective could be moved beyond the level of speculation and be
subjected to more rigorous empirical tests” (p. 312).
LaFree (1999), Rosenfeld (2000), and Ouimet (2002) have suggested
that the civilizing process may have a role to play in explaining the
current crime drop. More recently, and drawing on Eisner’s studies of
violence trends over the centuries, Pinker (2011) addresses the issue.
Pinker’s focus is on violence but also primarily the multiple-century
time spans that concern Elias and Eisner. However, the book does
discuss the recent crime drop, focusing on the United States, and pro-
poses mechanisms of change similar to those suggested by LaFree: “It
is possible that the recent declines in crime were related to the renewed
legitimacy of three traditional, and the growing support for three
newer, social institutions during the last decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. Declining crime rates in the 1990s may have been produced by
increasing trust in political institutions, increasing economic well-
being, and growing institutionalization of alternatives to the traditional
two parent American family. Increasing support for criminal justice,
welfare, and educational institutions in the 1990s has also put down-
ward pressure on crime rates” (1998, p. 1367).
Two issues are critical here. First, the mechanism by which the civ-
ilizing process occurs is extremely general—a notion that society im-
proved by a wide variety of means—and so the way in which this is
meant to have caused such a rapid and substantial decline in crime
rates as detailed here is extremely unclear. Notions of “increasing trust”
and “increasing support” in institutions are vague at best in terms of
how they might reduce a range of types of crime ranging from property
crimes to homicide, child sexual abuse, and intimate partner violence.
For instance, one of Pinker’s indicators of social improvement is the
rate of increase in mentions of rights issues in literature in recent de-
cades, despite the fact that these do not even really track changes in
crime. Second, insofar as a mechanism can be identiﬁed, the brief sec-
tion of the Pinker book on the recent crime drop provides no real
evidence to support its assertion that institutional social control over
the population declined in the 1960s (causing the crime rate to triple
or more) and that it strengthened in such a way that caused the crime
drop. On the other hand, if we interpret the civilizing hypothesis as
so general that it means “something positive happened to society in
the 1990s,” then nobody could disagree, but it becomes sufﬁciently
vague that it cannot be considered a scientiﬁc hypothesis. Hence, and
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in line with Eisner’s suggestion as quoted above, the inclusion of this
as a hypothesis here is generous.
The civilizing process could be assumed to have occurred cross-
nationally, though the speciﬁcs of the human rights issues were likely
different in the United States than in Europe and elsewhere. Similarly,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the timing of improvements
in institutional trust and support by offenders cannot be said not to
coincide with prior increases in crime. However, this hypothesis fails
both the e-crime and phone theft test and the variable trajectories test.
If society has civilized so rapidly that homicide fell by half in a decade
or so in some instances, then this is seriously contradicted by increased
theft and robbery of mobile phones and the range of Internet-related
crime. Similarly, if a civilizing process has occurred so rapidly and
broadly, then why are there some quite signiﬁcant anomalies both
within countries and between countries? These are the primary reasons
why this review concludes that the civilizing process offers little pros-
pect of explaining the recent crime drops. In a 2000 study on US
homicide rates, Rosenfeld is unable to identify an explanation and re-
verts to the civilizing process as a potential catchall hypothesis. Yet his
skepticism is evident, and he brilliantly captures its vagueness: “If
church is the last refuge of scoundrels, ‘culture’ is the ﬁnal recourse of
social scientists in search of explanations when existing economic, so-
cial and political theories have been exhausted” (2000, p. 157).
Hypothesis 15: Improved Security. Did improvements in the quality
and quantity of security induce the crime drop? There is strong eval-
uation evidence from studies covering Australia, England and Wales,
the Netherlands, and the United States ﬁnding that improved vehicle
security (particularly electronic immobilizers and central deadlocks)
caused dramatic declines in vehicle crime (Kriven and Ziersch 2007;
Farrell et al. 2011; Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley 2011; Fujita and Max-
ﬁeld 2012; Brown 2013; van Ours and Vollaard 2013). There is also
mounting evidence from the ICVS and from studies relating to En-
gland and Wales that improved household security caused the decline
in household burglary (van Dijk et al. 2007; Tilley, Farrell, and Clarke
2014), which ﬁts with a range of studies identifying household security
as effective (see Tseloni et al. 2014). Hence this hypothesis passes the
cross-national test. In each instance, the timing of the spread of se-
curity coincides with the start of the crime drop, and so it passes the
prior crime increase test.
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The security hypothesis is located within the crime opportunity the-
oretical framework, which suggests that the opportunities are crime
speciﬁc. This framework means that it is theoretically compatible for
some crime types to increase (as opportunities for those crimes in-
crease) at the same time as other crimes decrease (as opportunities for
those crimes decrease). Hence since valuable phones and the Internet
offered new and enticing crime opportunities, those crimes increased,
and this is compatible with the fact that security improvements induced
declines in other types of crime. Hence, unlike most other hypotheses,
this passes the phone theft and e-crimes test. In a similar vein, since
opportunities and the spread of security occurred at different times in
different places and in relation to different crime types, this hypothesis
is compatible with the fact that there is variation in the timing and
trajectory of the crime drop between countries and with the fact that
there is variation between crime types within countries. Hence the
hypothesis passes the variable trajectory test.
This hypothesis passes each of the four tests and is the only one that
does so. It is examined in more detail in Section IV.
Hypothesis 16: The Internet-Induced Changes in Lifestyles. “The In-
ternet” is included because although there have been few studies, there
is some prima facie reason to suggest that its rapid increase coincides
with the rapid decrease in crime, such that “the rise in the use of the
internet has very roughly coincided with falls in crime (in 1995 use of
the internet was not widespread). As it became more popular, it may
have helped to occupy young people’s time when they may otherwise
have turned to crime. It also provides more opportunity for online
crime which is not as easily quantiﬁable at present as traditional crime
types” (Ofﬁce of National Statistics 2013, p. 7). There is also the sug-
gestion that “lifestyle and routine activity changes, plus perceptions,
may have a larger explanatory role in relation to other crime types.
The rise of the Internet has roughly coincided with the declines in
crimes that get measured in traditional victimisation surveys, and took
place sooner in the US. Coincidence? Perhaps the huge criminal op-
portunities presented by the Internet sucked some offenders away from
traditional street crimes into online offending that is less routinely or
easily recorded” (Farrell et al. 2008, p. 21).
For present purposes, the Internet began with its public release by
America Online in 1994, but the crime drop began, at least in the
United States, in 1991, with crime falling dramatically there in the ﬁrst
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few years. This makes it implausible that the Internet caused the
crime drop. Further, the spread of the Internet was most tardy in the
least afﬂuent areas and comprised dial-up connections (remember the
screech?) and often pay-per-minute connections for many years. Any
signiﬁcant effect on the lifestyles of potential offenders and victims
could have taken effect signiﬁcantly only after the precipitous crime
declines began. This review has not been able to identify a peer-
reviewed study of the role of the Internet in the crime drop, but its
importance is such that it receives attention in relation to most things
and so is deemed worthy of brief discussion. At most, it is conceivable
that the Internet has induced lifestyle changes for both potential of-
fenders and potential victims (with consequent impacts on guardianship
if everyone stayed home more) that have had a subsequent consolida-
tion effect signiﬁcantly after the crime drop began.
Hypothesis 17: Phone Guardianship. The ﬁnal hypothesis included
here is that the rapid spread of mobile cell phones occurred around
the time that crime was falling, which may have a causal connection if
phones enhanced personal guardianship (Farrell et al. 2010; Klick,
MacDonald, and Stratmann 2012; Orrick and Piquero 2013). Orrick
and Piquero examine the correlation between mobile cell phone own-
ership and both property and violent crime in the United States. They
conclude, “In sum, the relationship of cell phone ownership to the
property crime rate between 1984 and 2009 indicates a negative, sig-
niﬁcant association . . . but virtually no relationship between cell phone
ownership and violent crime” (p. 8). This seems counterintuitive in-
sofar as, if mobile phones reduce crime via guardianship, we might
expect any effect to be mainly on personal crime because phones are
carried on the person. Hence while Orrick and Piquero acknowledge
that an association does not identify causation, the nature and existence
of that causation remains to be established. This suggests that the
research to date does not really provide supporting evidence other than
some correlation and some general argument, while it also reveals some
inconsistencies. Overall this tends to suggest that phone guardianship
is unlikely to prove to be a major contributor to the crime drop and
that the supporting evidence to date is somewhat less than compelling.
D. Discussion and Conclusions
The tests utilized here are imperfect as formal evaluation criteria.
They are better framed as broad guidelines that add some clarity with
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TABLE 3
Findings from Four Tests
Test
Hypothesis
Cross-
National
Prior Crime
Increase
E-Crime and
Phone Theft
Variable
Trajectories
1. Strong economy  X X X
2. Concealed weapons law X  X X
3. Capital punishment X  X X
4. Gun control laws X  X X
5. Imprisonment X X X X
6. Policing strategies X  X X
7. More police X  X X
8. Legalization of abortion X  X X
9. Immigration  X X X
10. Consumer conﬁdence  X X X
11. Waning hard-drugs market X  X X
12. Lead poisoning   X X
13. Changing demographics   X X
14. Civilizing process   X X
15. Improved security    
16. The Internet   X X
17. Phone guardianship    X
NOTE.— p pass; X p fail.
respect to key issues. Each relates to evaluation issues more generally,
and many published assessments include elements of some of the tests.
Nevertheless, the tests add value through facilitating some standardi-
zation of assessment criteria and allowing the wood to be seen from
the trees.
As summarized in table 3, one hypothesis fails all four tests, 10 hy-
potheses fail three, four fail two, and one fails only one but lacked
basic evidence (phone guardianship). Most of the failures were accom-
panied by a range of other criticisms, some rather damaging. One hy-
pothesis passes the four tests, and that is the security hypothesis. While
the tests are proposed as necessary criteria for a valid theory of the
crime drop, they are not deemed sufﬁcient, and so the security hy-
pothesis is examined in the next section.
IV. The Security Hypothesis
This section examines the security hypothesis. The most extensive sup-
porting evidence to date relates to car theft, which is tackled ﬁrst,
followed by burglary of dwellings. The role that improved security may
have played in reducing other crime types is then addressed. This is
followed by an explanation and preliminary supporting evidence relat-
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ing to how reductions in property crime, which accounts for most
crime and the bulk of crime in criminal careers, may have also caused
reductions in violent crimes of various types.
A. The Security Hypothesis
The security hypothesis proposes that change in the quantity and
quality of security was a signiﬁcant driver of declining crime:
• Security improvements, including speciﬁc security devices, vary
for different crimes but have been widely implemented.
• Different security measures work in different ways to reduce the
crimes to which they are applied: they increase actual or perceived
risk to the offender, and/or they reduce actual or perceived re-
ward for the offender, and/or they increase actual or perceived
effort for the offender.
• The different ways in which security measures work produce var-
iations in expected changes in crime patterns associated with
crime drops. These include expected security device crime change
“signatures.”
• The speciﬁc falls in crime produced by improvements in security
alongside their associated diffusions of beneﬁt (preventive effects
spilling out beyond the operational range of measures; see Guer-
ette and Bowers 2009) to other targets and methods of commit-
ting crime are not matched by equivalent displacement.
A progenitor is identiﬁable in Clarke and Newman’s (2006) book on
terrorism. They list developments in security that they link to declining
crime in many countries, concluding, “In fact, the one thing in com-
mon amongst all these countries, including the United States, is that
they have all made a huge investment in security during the past 25
years, affecting almost every aspect of everyday life” (p. 220). A news-
letter article by van Dijk (2006) made similar suggestions informed by
ICVS data on the spread of security across Europe, later summarized
as follows: “Perhaps a more signiﬁcant factor inhibiting crime across
the Western world is the universal growth in the possession and use
of private security measures by households and companies over the past
few decades. ICVS-based trend data on the use of precautionary mea-
sures conﬁrm that in all Western countries, without exception, the use
of measures to prevent property crimes such as car thefts and house-
hold burglaries has risen drastically over the past 15 years” (van Dijk
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et al. 2007, p. 23). In the context of the existing criminological liter-
ature, the security hypothesis applied to the crime drop can be viewed
as simply a speciﬁc version of the more general notion that situational
crime prevention can be effective. In what follows, key empirical ﬁnd-
ings relating to the relationship between security and the crime drop
are examined.
B. Vehicle Theft
With crime close to its apex in many countries, Clarke and Harris
(1992) cited a study of 56 new cars that found that “the ease with which
locked cars can be broken into would be laughable if it weren’t so
serious. Our security tester has got into nearly all cars he has checked
in a matter of seconds, using the unsophisticated tools of the car thief’s
trade” (Which? 1988, p. 118; cited in Clarke and Harris 1992, p. 37).
Key studies of auto theft spanning Australia, England and Wales, the
Netherlands, and the United States lend support to the security hy-
pothesis, suggesting that more and better vehicle security reduced ve-
hicle crime and, thereby, may also have contributed to the collapse in
other crime types. The following subsections describe key data signa-
tures that indicate both how and why improved vehicle security was a
determinant of declining vehicle theft. Eck and Madensen (2009) link
such data signatures to the broader evaluation literature.
1. Turning Point and Trajectory. Two data signatures are detailed
here. The ﬁrst is the correlation between the growth of vehicle security
and the crime decline. Of course correlation does not establish cau-
sality, which is what the other signatures collectively indicate. The sec-
ond signature is the assessment of the timing of the introduction of
improved security in different countries at different times and how in
each instance it occurs immediately prior to the downturn in car crime.
Fujita and Maxﬁeld (2012) observe that the introduction and spread
of electronic immobilizers and central deadlocking systems in the
United States coincide with the start and trajectory of the crime drop.
They also show that, in contrast, the introduction of parts marking
does not. Brown (2013) notes that unlike in many other countries,
there was no national legislation to require electronic immobilizers in
the United States and suggests, rather, that it was indirectly promoted
by the Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984 (HR 6257).
He notes that “the legislation, which came into force in 1987, required
manufacturers to mark the Vehicle Identiﬁcation Number onto the
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engine, transmission and 12 major body parts. The legislation also al-
lowed for exemption from parts marking on some of the manufac-
turer’s models if anti-theft devices were installed as standard equip-
ment. It appears that these ‘anti-theft’ devices commonly consisted of
electronic immobilisers” (Brown 2013, p. 12).
While the European Union formally mandated electronic immobi-
lizers in new cars from 1998, the underpinning legislation had been
passed in 1995, and the writing was on the wall for some time. In the
United Kingdom, for instance, a car theft index had been published in
1992 (Houghton 1992), and government pressure brought to bear on
vehicle manufacturers to tackle the car crime problem. Laycock (2004)
identiﬁes the car theft index and government leverage as instrumental
in inducing the drop in UK car theft, and to the extent that both the
introduction of immobilizers and the subsequent decline in car theft
occurred in advance of other European countries, we might reasonably
deduce that she is correct.
Figure 7 contains two panels. Panel A shows trends in vehicle in-
security (those without security) for immobilizers and central locking
alongside the trend in theft of and from vehicles, for England and
Wales 1991–2007. The CSEW did not distinguish between electronic
and other vehicle immobilizers until the late 1990s, and so panel B
extrapolates backward for the trend in electronic immobilizers prior to
1999. The exponential regression line ﬁts the known data almost per-
fectly (R2p .9988), and assuming the extrapolation is correct, the tim-
ing of the introduction of electronic immobilizers since 1993 ﬁts pre-
cisely with the initiation of the crime drop—just as Fujita and Maxﬁeld
(2012) found it did for the United States—and squares with Laycock’s
(2004) assessment. Van Ours and Vollard (2013) similarly link the in-
troduction of immobilizers in the Netherlands directly to the timing
of the major drop in car theft that occurred in that country and esti-
mate the theft risks of cars with immobilizers at around half that of
those without.
The emphasis here on the timing of electronic immobilizers partly
reﬂects additional analysis that suggests they have been most effective
in reducing vehicle thefts (Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley 2011; Brown
2013). The evidence that the timing of electronic immobilizers in the
United States, England and Wales, and the Netherlands coincides with
crime’s turning point is further supported by evidence from Australia.
Australia also facilitates a natural experiment because high-quality
FIG. 7.—A, Theft of and from vehicles and percentage of vehicles without key security
measures, 1991–2006, indexed to 100 in 1991. B, Percentage of vehicle-owning households
with key security devices (with extrapolation for electronic immobilizers for years before 1999).
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales.
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FIG. 8.—Temporary and permanent vehicle thefts per 1,000 vehicle-owning households,
England and Wales, 1995–2010/11. Source: Ofﬁce of National Statistics, Crime Survey for
England and Wales.
immobilizers were introduced in the state of Western Australia ahead
of elsewhere (Farrell et al. 2011). Consistent with electronic immobi-
lizers being instrumental, the decline in vehicle theft in Western Aus-
tralia began in 1998 (immobilizers had been subsidized from 1997 and
were mandated in 1999), whereas immobilizers were mandated else-
where for new cars in Australia in 2001, after which national car theft
rates fell rapidly.
2. Impact on Professional and Organized Crime. Figure 8 shows the
decline in vehicle theft in England and Wales from 1995 to 2010, split
into permanent and temporary thefts. In the 16 years from 1995 to
2010, the vehicle theft rate declined 84 percent, comprising a 90 per-
cent fall in temporary thefts and a three-quarters (76 percent) fall in
permanent thefts. Temporary theft, in which a vehicle is abandoned
and recovered, is a reasonable proxy for thefts motivated by joyriding,
theft for transportation, or theft for use of the vehicle in the commis-
sion of another crime (Clarke and Harris 1992). Permanent theft is a
reasonable proxy for theft of vehicles to be sold for parts or “chopped”
and vehicles to be resold. Hence temporary and permanent thefts are
held to be good indicators of the relationship between more amateur
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or early-career thieves and those who are more professional or working
with an organized crime group.
Temporary theft declined more rapidly and to a greater extent than
permanent theft in the ﬁrst decade of decline. Between 1995 and 2001,
temporary theft declined by 76 percent and permanent theft by “only”
44 percent. This conforms with expectation if improved vehicle secu-
rity is more likely to disrupt thefts by less experienced adolescent car
thieves.
Between 2005 and 2010, however, the decline in permanent and
temporary thefts was similar (50 and 48 percent, respectively). This,
we conjecture, may be due to the more recent spread in tracking de-
vices, which prove a highly effective deterrent. The suggestion is based
on the expectation that tracking devices are unusually disruptive of the
work of professional thieves. This is consistent with results of Ayres
and Levitt (1998) and with detailed analyses of CSEW data to 2007
by Farrell et al. (2011) and Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley (2011), who
concluded that tracking devices were highly effective but had not pen-
etrated the vehicle ﬂeet to a sufﬁcient extent to have played a major
role in prior crime drops. From the perspective of the security hy-
pothesis, the fact that permanent theft also declined dramatically is
notable because it suggests that security can be highly effective against
professional and organized crime.
The ﬁndings reviewed here for England and Wales are largely rep-
licated in Australia (Kriven and Ziersch 2007; Farrell et al. 2011). The
decline in vehicle theft in Australia began around 2001, when elec-
tronic immobilizers were mandated, with overall vehicle theft declining
by around half in the 6 years to 2007. Here, temporary theft declined
58 percent compared to a 13 percent reduction in permanent thefts,
though the proportion of permanent thefts was always signiﬁcantly
lower than in England and Wales.
3. Broken Windows and Forced Doors. Figure 9 shows trends in the
means of entry for vehicle theft in England and Wales from 1995 to
2010. In 1995, the forcing of a door or lock was by far the most prev-
alent means of entry, accounting for almost two-thirds (65 percent).
The decline in vehicle theft that ensued was experienced as primarily
a decline in the forcing of doors and door locks. This pattern is con-
sistent with improved central deadlocks on doors having induced the
decline in crime. Over time, other means of entry also declined, but
the way in which they did so is different. The second-most prevalent
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FIG. 9.—Means of entry for vehicle theft in England and Wales, 1995–2011. Source: Ofﬁce
of National Statistics, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
means of entry to vehicles in 1995 was window breaking. Yet there was
no decline in the prevalence of window breaking as a means of entry
between 1995 and 1997, and it subsequently declined less rapidly than
door and lock forcing. Likewise, other means of entry also declined
but can be interpreted as likely a diffusion of beneﬁts: even if they
could enter a vehicle, offenders had learned that they probably could
not steal it because of the spread of immobilizers. Hence the general
decline in most means of entry, driven by the decline in door and lock
forcing, appears consistent with the expected impact of improved ve-
hicle security.
The analysis of means of entry to vehicles was also conducted for
Australian vehicle thefts for the period 2001–7 by Farrell, Tseloni, and
Tilley (2011), extending the work of Kriven and Ziersch (2007), which
covered 2001–4. The data cover a shorter period, but the ﬁndings are
similar to those for England and Wales: lock forcing was the dominant
means of entry prior to 2001 and accounted for the bulk of the decline
in means of entry, falling disproportionately relative to other means of
entry that fell later and less dramatically.
4. Vehicular Demographics. An increase in the average age of stolen
vehicles is an important data signature. This is what would be expected
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if newer vehicles were more difﬁcult to steal. Brown and Thomas
(2003) and Brown (2004) found that the average age of stolen vehicles
in England and Wales increased signiﬁcantly as vehicle theft declined.
Likewise, Kriven and Ziersch (2007) identiﬁed signiﬁcant aging of sto-
len vehicles in Australia after 2001 when electronic immobilizers be-
came mandatory on new vehicles. Van Ours and Vollaard (2013) pro-
duce similar ﬁndings for the Netherlands.
5. Horses for Courses. The Security Impact Assessment Tool (SIAT)
was developed to assist in identifying the different crime reduction
effects of individual security devices (Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley 2011).
It is also described later in relation to household security devices. It
produced a metric that gauges the effectiveness of devices relative to
the absence of security, termed the security protection factor (SPF).
There is a useful parallel with sun protection factor (SPF) used for
sunscreen cream, because each states the amount of time units, relative
to the absence of protection, after which the owner is burned.
The analysis found considerable variation in the effectiveness of in-
dividual vehicle security devices. Tracking devices produced the largest
effects, but mostly too recent to account for the drop in vehicle thefts
of the early 1990s. Electronic immobilizers were found highly effective.
Moreover, as might be expected, newer vehicles often included com-
binations of devices including built-in immobilizers, central locking,
and alarms, and these produced positive interaction effects that im-
proved overall security.
The best-ranked security combinations were found to reduce theft
risk by a factor of 25 compared to a vehicle without security devices.
The impact of devices and combinations worked better for some crime
types than for others, and the patterns squared with theoretical expec-
tation based on assessment of the preventive mechanism. For example,
electronic immobilizers have an impact more on theft of vehicles than
on theft from vehicles, while central locking systems affected both theft
of and theft from vehicles. Alarms had a more modest effect generally,
but this was greater against theft from vehicles than theft of vehicles.
While the study acknowledges that the ﬁndings may conﬂate some
effects of vehicle age and security quality, the strength of the ﬁndings
is sufﬁcient to conclude that, at minimum, security devices can have a
considerable impact on crime and that the effect of individual devices
and their combination varies by crime type.
6. Implication for Other Hypotheses. While developed to examine the
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role of security, the data signatures examined here can be assessed in
terms of their implications for other crime drop hypotheses. None of
the other hypotheses can explain these data signatures. Further, the
data signatures would not be expected to demonstrate the detailed var-
iation shown here if car theft trends were examined through the lenses
of the alternative hypotheses. There would be no particular reason for
any change in the proportions of different means of entry, for example,
or for the aging of stolen vehicles, that were found in each of Australia,
the Netherlands, and England and Wales and that we anticipate will
be identiﬁed in North America and elsewhere should suitable data be
analyzed. Hence while all of these data signatures are consistent with
a security hypothesis, they also further refute rival hypotheses.
This does not mean that all data patterns relating to vehicle crime
have been explained in terms of the security hypothesis, as much re-
search remains to be undertaken. For instance, Fujita and Maxﬁeld
(2012) note that declines in car theft in the United States were geo-
graphically skewed, being higher in the Northeast, for example. A pos-
sible explanation is the differential rates of turnover of vehicles in
different areas: areas where the car ﬂeet is replaced more quickly, par-
ticularly afﬂuent areas, would be expected to experience preventive
gains more quickly.
C. Burglary
Comparative analysis of 18 EU countries using data from the 2005
ICVS concluded, “It is clear that levels of household security have
increased in most European countries. Speciﬁcally the percentages of
households with burglar alarms show upward trends in all countries
for which trend data are available, with the possible exception of
France. There have been particularly steep increases since 1992 in
Sweden and Italy but also among the countries at the bottom of the
scale (Poland, Estonia, Finland, Denmark and Spain)” (van Dijk et al.
2007, p. 84).
While the ICVS is the best source for extensive cross-national com-
parison, the in-depth analysis it facilitates is more limited in terms of
both information and sample sizes. Tseloni et al. (2014) examine the
effectiveness of household security devices and seek to identify the
contributions to burglary reduction from each of individual devices and
their combination. They use the SIAT approach mentioned previously
in relation to vehicle security devices, with detailed data for England
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FIG. 10.—Household insecurity and burglary rate, 1995–2011. Source: Ofﬁce of National
Statistics, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
and Wales. Their ﬁndings are largely consistent with those of previous
studies, concluding that combinations of devices, particularly dead bolt
locks on doors, window locks, and internal and external lights, can
dramatically reduce burglary risk. Figure 10 shows trends in the house-
hold burglary rate alongside trends in insecurity, measured as house-
holds without individual household security devices in England and
Wales. Although household security was increasing while burglary was
decreasing, the correspondence between the two is not as clear as it
was for vehicle crime. That is, the increase in household security ap-
pears more modest and less rapid than was the increase in vehicle
security. One possible explanation is the positive interaction effect of
multiple security devices at the same property, which can sometimes
be considerable (Tseloni et al. 2014). Another, offered by Tilley, Far-
rell, and Clarke (2014), is that there was an increase in the quality of
security devices that is not apparent in the trend data of ﬁgure 10. In
relation to auto theft, the timing and extent of the spread of electronic
immobilizers and central locking coincided well, and this was most
evident when legislation mandated immobilizers to meet particular
standards (as in Australia and the European Union). In relation to
Why the Crime Drop? 469
households, however, security devices of various types were already
quite prevalent by the early 1990s, and so not only is the increase in
prevalence of devices per household more modest but any coincidence
with the turning point in burglary rates is less obvious. Tilley et al.
hypothesize that the spread of double-glazed windows for home in-
sulation may have been particularly important in promoting the spread
of better-quality security in new and replacement windows and doors.
The data signature that they develop relates to a change over time in
the means of entry to property. The rationale is that some burglaries
do not require security to be overcome to gain entry whereas others
do. Burglaries in which security had to be overcome were deﬁned as
those requiring
• the forcing of locks on doors, the forcing of locks on windows,
the removal or breaking of a door panel, and the removal or
breaking of a glass window.
Burglaries in which security was not overcome, that is, in which there
was another entry method, were identiﬁed as those in which entry
required
• a door (or window) was already unlocked or open, the burglar
had a key, the burglar pushed past the occupant, or false pretenses
(deception) were involved.
Trends in these two broad types of entry are shown for completed
burglaries with entry in ﬁgure 11. In the early stages of the downturn
in burglary, between 1996 and 1998, security-related burglaries decline
21 percent compared to 4 percent for burglaries with entry by other
means. Over the longer term, between 1994 and 2003, burglaries that
were security related declined 59 percent compared to 28 percent for
burglaries by other means, consistent with security improvements hav-
ing induced a diffusion of beneﬁts that also reduced burglaries by other
means of entry.
In addition, the decline in burglary via a window had a strong inverse
correlation with the spread of double glazing where the whole house-
hold was double-glazed (ﬁg. 12). Data were available for 1996–2008,
during which time burglaries in which the window was the entry
method fell by 70 percent compared to a 20 percent fall in burglaries
by another entry method. The study concludes,
The importance of this analysis is, we think, as follows. Counts of
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FIG. 11.—Means of entry as an indicator of the role of security: burglary with entry in
England and Wales, 1992–2011. Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales.
numbers of security devices do not show changes in the quality of
particular devices. Door and window locks in particular are much
better than they once were, particularly when combined with dou-
ble glazing and home insulation efforts. The result is that, in a
survey’s counts, a better device still just counts as one device. Fur-
ther, when it is a new-for-old replacement, no change in the count
of devices is registered. So, the ﬁnding that there is a greater de-
cline in security-breaking burglaries relative to other means of en-
try is, we suggest, a signature of the improved quality of house-
hold security devices. (Tilley, Farrell, and Clarke 2014)
The amount of research linking security to falling burglary rates is
less extensive than that for car crime. This likely reﬂects both the slow
pace of research and the possibility that speciﬁc household security data
may be less readily available as well as the fact that change in the
quality of devices is less readily perceived. In addition, household bur-
glary in the United States has been declining far longer than in many
countries according to the NCVS. Examining double glazing and
household insulation may not transfer to the United States because
the housing stock is, on average, somewhat different. In particular,
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FIG. 12.—Change in levels of double glazing and burglary with entry, 1996–2008. Source:
Crime Survey for England and Wales.
wooden-structure housing is far more common across much of North
America than in England and Wales. Likewise, the need for insulation
and the more extensive adoption of air conditioning offer somewhat
different prospects for research. Central air conditioning is increasingly
common and could promote the closing and locking of windows and
doors. However, air conditioning units located in windows could con-
ceivably afford an opportunity for illegal access, though, at the same
time, perhaps less than that of an open window or door. Introduction
of planning and building regulations to design out crime in the Neth-
erlands in the late 1990s caused a 25 percent reduction in burglary in
the areas with new housing. The beneﬁts were spread across the entire
country (diffusion): an estimated 5 percent of the national fall in bur-
glary rates in the following 10 years is attributed to them (Vollaard
and van Ours 2011). Hence there is an identiﬁable need for context-
speciﬁc research in different countries.
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D. Other Crime Types
In the overall picture of crime drop research, the security hypothesis
is a relatively recent contender. This partly reﬂects more recent rec-
ognition of the international nature of declining crime as well as de-
clines in property crimes. Yet a foundation has been laid for a range
of further research examining the role of security, and situational and
routine activity factors more generally.
1. Robbery and Theft. Tseloni et al. (2012) outline a preliminary
research agenda that incorporates a learning process. They suggest a
progression of research from property crime to acquisitive crime in-
volving personal crime components (robbery and theft) that, they con-
jecture, will provide information to inform the study of violent crime.
Certain types of robbery seem likely to be the low hanging fruit for
next steps in research into the security hypothesis. If rates of improve-
ment in bank security of various sorts can be identiﬁed, particularly at
the level of individual bank chains and locations, then the relationship
between security improvements and bank robbery might be investi-
gated. Other types of risky facilities offer similar possibilities, and
banks are just one for which good data may well be available. Were
different types of bank security introduced at different branches at dif-
ferent times, for example, then this ought to facilitate the development
of data signatures that parse out the security-robbery relationship. As
with cars, if newer banks have better designs and security, then they
ought to have lower crime rates. Security measures that are indepen-
dent of capital infrastructure, such as exploding dye in money bags
given to robbers, would be expected to produce particular data signa-
tures, including perhaps an effect on the rate of repeat robberies at the
same locations (Matthews, Pease, and Pease [2001] identify repeat bank
robbery as extensive). Bank robbery is one obvious research possibility,
but other types of risky facilities experiencing robbery or other crime
types may offer other good prospects.
2. Shoplifting. Theft from stores, termed shoplifting, is a volume
crime. It typically receives less attention than many crime types because
it is not captured in victim surveys of the population (only in surveys
of businesses) and because it is less serious, per average offense, than
many crime types.
Proliﬁc and violent offenders are also frequent thieves (and more
evidence to that effect is offered in the next section of this essay). This
means that shoplifting may, alongside car theft, be a keystone that,
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once removed, leads to broader declines in other crime types. Pur-
chasing of goods in stores used to take place primarily over the counter,
with store owners passing each item to the customer. This practice
changed largely in the post–World War II period, when it became
apparent that removing the counter and allowing customers to interact
with the products would increase sales. The opportunity, temptation,
and impulse purchases that access to goods on sale provided also pro-
vided major new crime opportunities for theft, and so shoplifting in-
creased rapidly, likely promoted by larger stores and superstores with
reduced surveillance and increased anonymity as well as a proliferation
in consumer products that are suitable for theft (Tilley 2010). Con-
sequent upon this wave of shoplifting, it has been suggested that
bit by bit, countermeasures were introduced: staff were trained to
be vigilant, cash tills were relocated to give better sight-lines down
the aisles, window displays were changed to expose vulnerable cor-
ners to glancing passers-by, mirrors and CCTV were introduced,
store detectives and exit guards were recruited, high-value items
were tethered or locked behind glass, dummy goods or packaging
were put on display without the costly product inside, and a whole
ingenious new industry was spawned to provide lockable cabinets,
tell-tale markers, sensors, alarms, spider wraps, security gates,
radio-frequency tags and extended families of visible deterrents.
. . . Just as the removal of shop counters had led to a crime epi-
demic, so restoring a semblance of security alleviated it. Shoplift-
ing still accounts for almost half of all known commercial crime,
but surveys suggest it fell 60 per cent in the decade up to 2012.
(Ross 2013, chap. 2, section on “Shoplifting”)
A report on victimization surveys of businesses in England and Wales
that compared crime rates in 2002 to those in 2012 found,
In both 2002 and 2012, the crime type most frequently experi-
enced by wholesale and retail premises was theft by customers,
with 11.5 million of this type of incidents estimated in 2002 and
4.1 million in 2012. In both years, this was followed by theft by
unknown persons, with 3.2 million incidents in 2002 and 1.8 mil-
lion in 2012. . . . In addition, the proportion of wholesale and re-
tail premises experiencing theft by customers (the crime most
commonly experienced by wholesalers and retailers) fell from 43
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per cent to 21 per cent between the 2002 and 2012 CVS [Com-
mercial Victimisation Survey]. (Home Ofﬁce 2013, p. 14)
Hence the incidence of shoplifting (theft by customers) fell 64 percent,
the incidence of theft by unknown persons fell 44 percent, and the
prevalence of shoplifting fell 51 percent across the decade. The time
period covered here does not go back to the 1990s, when many other
crimes were falling, but an earlier version of the survey had been con-
ducted in 1994. The comparison of that survey with the 2002 survey
identiﬁed a decline in crime, though not as steep as the decline that
ensued, and concluded that “the ﬁndings are broadly consistent with
trends in crime against individuals” (Taylor 2004, p. 2). Hence while
only a small segment of the relevant research has been addressed here,
it identiﬁes a potentially fruitful line of inquiry for further research
into the security hypothesis.
3. Homicide. Homicide appears to represent a challenge. While
there is a body of research into homicide and the crime drop (e.g.,
Rosenfeld 2000), there is not, to our knowledge, a study of the wide-
spread falls in homicide that focuses on its situational aspects. This,
we suggest, may be a worthy avenue of inquiry.6 From the perspective
of crime opportunity theory, other changes in the opportunity struc-
ture in addition to security could inﬂuence homicide. Here there is a
potential overlap with what are termed the debut crime hypothesis and
the keystone hypothesis, described next.
E. The Keystone and Debut Crime Hypotheses
1. Keystones and Criminal Careers. Many types of crime are inter-
related. Security improvements bringing dramatic reductions in vol-
ume crimes, including car crime and household property crimes, might
reasonably be expected to have knock-on effects on other types of
crime. There is an analogy with the removal of the keystone from an
arch wherein the other stones tumble, such that this relationship has
been termed the keystone hypothesis (Farrell et al. 2008, 2010). Re-
ductions in car theft deny use of the road to offenders who steal ve-
hicles for the commission of other types of crime. Stolen cars are
instrumental in many burglaries, in which they are used for transpor-
tation. Cars stolen for transportation are relocating offenders who, cet-
6 This suggestion owes a debt to discussions with Neil Boyd.
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eris paribus, have a greater than average likelihood of being involved
in further crimes, including violence, on arrival. Fencing of stolen
goods is likely to decline when burglary is harder to commit and stolen
transportation vehicles are less readily obtained. Shrunken stolen goods
markets would likely incur lower rates of disputes, robberies, and as-
saults. Where stolen cars were used either to drive to drug markets or
to provide a supply, this becomes increasingly difﬁcult. Without a sto-
len vehicle, it may be more difﬁcult to start and continue a gang feud.
Retributive violence including drive-by shootings may be delayed and,
where delayed, may be less likely overall, as is the case when suicide
is delayed (Lester 2012). Inducing delay may be a technique of situa-
tional crime prevention that warrants further study.
Criminal career research provides a platform for investigating the
keystone hypothesis. Offending careers are typically divided into the
majority that are short and limited to adolescents and those that are
long or life course persistent (Mofﬁtt 1993). The “keystone” element
of the hypothesis rests partly on the relationship between the com-
mission of different types of crime for which career specialism and
generalism might be used as a proxy. There is strong evidence that
most offenders are versatile, or generalists, though there is some spe-
cialization. Most crime is property crime, not violence, and so the ca-
reers of most life course offenders tend to be dominated by property
crime despite the fact that there can be some violence specialization.
Farrington (1998) observed that “only a small proportion of offenses
in criminal careers are violent: 15 percent up to age 40 in the Cam-
bridge Study . . . 9 percent up to age thirty in the ﬁrst Philadelphia
age cohort study . . . and 5 percent up to age twenty-ﬁve in the Stock-
holm Project Metropolitan” (p. 435). While a more recent review in-
dicates that “in a long-term analysis of specialization using conviction
records from the South London male cohort through age 40, Piquero
et al. (2007) found little evidence of specialization in violence and con-
cluded that the strongest predictor of a violent conviction over the
course of a criminal career was the number of convictions. More fre-
quent offenders had a higher likelihood of conviction for a violent
crime” (Piquero et al. 2014, p. 14). That review also suggests that
serious theft offenders are more likely to be violent offenders, poten-
tially linking reductions in acquisitive crimes to broader crime declines.
If property crime dominates the portfolio of most offenders, and it
is property crime on which improved security has acted most dramat-
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ically, then disrupting this primary component of the offending port-
folio may have disrupted the less frequently committed, and probably
related, violent offenses. In particular, violence that is committed as an
instrumental or supporting part of property crime, as an inadvertent
consequence of involvement in property crime, or as the result of in-
volvement with criminal peers (victimization rates among offenders be-
ing inordinately high; Lauritsen and Laub 2007) is likely to decrease
as natural wastage when the property crime keystone is removed. More
broadly, this suggests that preventing property crime may be the best
way to prevent violent crime. The review by Piquero et al. further
notes that “the analyses of specialization in criminal careers suggest
that there is little speciﬁc concentration within offense types among
most offenders. This overall conclusion holds with respect to different
samples, measures of offending (including the incorrect presumption of
specialization among sex offenders; Zimring et al., 2008, 2009), and time
periods” (Piquero et al. 2014, p. 15; emphasis added). The “incorrect
presumption of specialization among sex offenders” is particularly im-
portant in the present context. It potentially provides the missing link
that could explain why sexual victimization may have declined as a
result of security-induced reductions in property crime. From here it
is a small conceptual leap to suggest that child abuse and domestic
violence may also have declined as a beneﬁcial knock-on effect of the
drop in property crime.
2. Debuts and Legacies. Among ﬁrst-conviction offense types, “the
crime most readily identiﬁable as a strategic offence is vehicle theft,
but non-vehicle thefts and robberies (including mugging) are also pre-
dictive of a long and serious subsequent career in delinquency” (Svens-
son 2002, p. 395). More recently, Owen and Cooper (2013) found that
“offenders who committed robbery or vehicle theft as their debut of-
fence were at the greatest risk of becoming chronic offenders” (p. 3).
Hence vehicle theft is a strategic debut crime offense, and preventing
vehicle theft may be a means of disrupting the onset of criminal ca-
reers, which in turn might be expected to reduce the frequency and
seriousness of offending. This is termed the debut crime hypothesis.
Cook and Laub (2002) observed that the prior crime peaks were an
“epidemic of youth violence,” and Butts (2000) observed that the crime
drop in the United States has been experienced disproportionately as
a decline in adolescence-limited offending. This is shown in ﬁgures 13
and 14 as age-speciﬁc offense rates for aggregate groups of violent
FIG. 13.—A, Violent crime age-speciﬁc arrest rates. B, Percentage change in violent crime
arrest rates, 1994–2010. Source: Bureau of Justice Statisics.
FIG. 14.—A, Property crime age-speciﬁc arrest rates. B, Percentage change in property crime
arrest rates, 1988–2010. Source: Bureau of Justice Statisics.
Why the Crime Drop? 479
crime and property crime in the United States, 1980–2010. Each of
the ﬁgures contains two panels, of which the ﬁrst shows a set of age-
crime curves and the second the percentage change in arrest rates be-
tween the crime peak (measured by the UCR) and 2010. The change
over time in the age-crime curves is consistent with the security hy-
pothesis. That is, we suggest that the disproportionate drop in adoles-
cence-limited offending is consistent with an interpretation that the
number of crime opportunities declined, reducing offending among the
less experienced and those less entrenched in a criminal career. This
squares well with the fact that reductions in car theft occurred dispro-
portionately as a reduction in temporary theft for joyriding and trans-
portation.
The comparative age-crime curves demonstrate a decline in offend-
ing rates in most age groups by 2010, with the exception of those
offenders aged in their 40s. This is shown in the second panel of each
ﬁgure when the bars cross from negative to positive at the right-hand
side or less obviously in each ﬁrst panel when the age-crime curves
cross to the right-hand side. That is, in 2010 the per capita rate of
offending among those in their 40s is, in contrast to other age groups,
higher than when crime was at its peak. Yet these offenders, close to
age 40 by 2010, were at the peak offending ages when crime rates were
highest 20 years previously. We interpret the higher offending rates
among offenders in their 40s as a legacy of the plentiful crime oppor-
tunities of the late 1980s when these offenders learned their trade (Far-
rell, Laycock, and Tilley, n.d.). If plentiful crime opportunities of the
1980s increased the number of offenders who continued into lengthy
criminal careers, this suggests that decisions to embark on criminal
careers are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by situational factors and that a
substantial proportion of life course–persistent offenders could be
swing voters who would be deterred were easy crime opportunities
unavailable when they were adolescents.
3. Discussion. This section reviewed evidence that improvements in
security reduced crime opportunities and caused the crime drop. The
evidence that improved security caused some crimes to fall, particularly
car theft, is strong, while evidence relating to other types of property
crime is mounting.
Further research into the keystone and debut crime hypotheses that
links the declines in violent crime to those of property crime might be
pursued with cautious optimism. Most criminal careers are nonspe-
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cialist and dominated by property crime, while some violent crime is
undertaken as an endeavor to support property crime, and the trends
in age-speciﬁc arrest rates appear consistent with the security hypoth-
esis. Together these facts suggest that some further exploration of this
connection is warranted. However, this must be tempered by, and take
account of, the empirical anomalies identiﬁed earlier including the later
decline in car theft in Canada, the later decline in homicide in the
United Kingdom, and the apparently signiﬁcant variation in the decline
across crime types in other countries.
V. Conclusions
There has been signiﬁcant progress in crime drop research. The quest
to identify the causes of the dramatic decline in crime has spurred a
range of competing hypotheses, theory development and theory test-
ing, innovative approaches, and methodologies. Hence it is proving an
unusually productive research question. In that context it is surprising
that there was perhaps never really the same drive among criminolo-
gists to explain the prior crime increases, where even the compelling
routine activities approach seems to remain both underresearched and
underappreciated. The routine activities approach is, we suggest, com-
patible with the security hypothesis, the main difference being that
crime increases were argued to be due to inadvertent changes in the
opportunity structure whereas security is deliberate.
Many inﬂuential criminological theories have not gotten out of the
starting blocks when it comes to explaining the crime drop. This ob-
servation has become more apparent as the crime drop persisted
through recession and the global economic downturn that began in
2008–9. Thus the long-term beneﬁt to criminological theory of crime
drop research should be extensive, requiring substantial revision to
many theory texts.
Two key changes in the orientation of crime drop research emerged
largely in its second decade that are characterized here as phase 2 re-
search. The ﬁrst was recognition that the crime drop has been inter-
national in nature, affecting many advanced countries in ways similar
though far from identical to the United States. The second has been
recognition of the importance of property crime. Within the United
States, the drop in violence followed that in auto theft and seems to
continue to track it remarkably closely. The available evidence suggests
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that the drop in auto theft in different countries coincided with the
growth of vastly improved vehicle security, particularly high-quality
electronic immobilizers and central deadlocking.
Blumstein and Wallman’s The Crime Drop in America (2000) is
rightly considered a landmark. It achieved sufﬁcient recognition that a
second edition appeared only 6 years later—somewhat unusual for an
academic work that is not a textbook. Yet it has not dated well in the
subsequent phase 2 decade of crime drop research, and much of its
content seems now to be largely of historical value, with hindsight
suggesting that its focus on violence and a single country was rather
too narrow.
Seventeen explanations for the international crime drop from the
academic literature were examined. In addition to an examination of
the literature relating to each, some extra light was shed on them by
subjecting them each to four evidence-based tests. While hindsight is
20/20, a surprising number of hypotheses now appear rather parochial
and cannot explain the crime drop in more than one country, failing
the cross-national test. Likewise, some hypotheses were inconsistent
with what seems to be the basic fact that crime had previously been
increasing for several decades. Most were irreconcilable with the fact
that some crimes have increased at the time that many crimes have
decreased, and few hypotheses could account for the variation between
countries and crime types in the timing and trajectory of the crime
drop. Sixteen of the 17 hypotheses failed at least one of the four tests,
and most failed at least two.
The evidence examined here identiﬁes the security hypothesis as the
most promising explanation for crime drops. The framework of crime
opportunity theory and routine activity theory in which it nestles pro-
vides ﬂexibility in terms of addressing different types of crimes in dif-
ferent contexts. It is worth speculating on why security, and the the-
oretical areas of crime opportunity theory, principally rational choice
and routine activities, seem to have featured little in earlier debates.
Perhaps it was how the debate initially focused on violence, perhaps it
was that rational choice and routine activities theories are not driven
as much by an underlying ideology as many others, or perhaps it is the
manner in which they tend to frame offenders as typically less able
decision makers who are relatively easily inﬂuenced by their surround-
ing environment.
The main policy implications of the security hypothesis are straight-
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forward. Architects, urban planners, product designers, and others
should take account of crime in their blueprints. Governments should
encourage this by all appropriate means, including regulation where
necessary, but perhaps preferably through market-based incentives
(Farrell and Roman 2006; Eck and Eck 2012; Tilley 2012). Problem
solving and situational crime prevention would appear to offer the most
viable approach to e-crime and to new crimes that emerge in the fu-
ture. Policing might adapt to reemphasize crime prevention as its pri-
mary mission, using problem-solving approaches to modify the crime
opportunity structure and playing a role in nudging business owners,
place managers, and others into reducing their emissions of easy crime
opportunities.
Further research into the security hypothesis is required, and several
possible avenues have been suggested here. At worst it seems likely to
prove a good explanation for the drop in car theft and other property
crimes while providing insight for continued pursuit of explanations
for violence. For the present authors it is a rather positive hypothesis
insofar as it suggests that the solution to most crime lies in the hands
of governments, and it provides a methodology—that of a problem-
solving situational crime prevention—to achieve continued reductions
in crime in the future. The best security is innocuous, liberating, and
empowering—witness the electronic vehicle immobilizer—and offers
no threat but many beneﬁts to democratic society.
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